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Abstract. In this article we focus attention on the remaining problem of defining 
Terrorism  and  Cyberterrorism.  Throughout  relevant  decisions  of  the  Tribunal  of 
Lebanon as a case of study, recognizing international consuetudinary law on terrorism, we 
analyse critically the EU Antiterrorism measure and the right to privacy in the EU and 
ECHR prospective to conclude in the need for strengthening the protection of individuals 
against acts affecting the right to privacy.  
 
Resumen. En este estudio centramos la atención en el persistente problema de encontrar  
una definición para el terrorismo y para el ciber terrorismo en particular. A través del  
análisis de pronunciamientos relevantes del Tribunal Especial para El Líbano -usado  
como un caso de estudio- en los que se identifican normas de derecho internacional  
consuetudinario sobre terrorismo, analizamos críticamente las medidas antiterroristas  
adoptadas en el seno de la UE en contraste con el derecho a la privacidad protegido por el  
Derecho de la Unión y por el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y sostenemos la  
necesidad de reforzar la protección de los individuos frente a actos que afecten al ejercicio  
de este derecho a la privacidad.  
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1. Introduction  
Cyber terrorism includes serious conducts such as targeted attacks, politically motivated,  
conducted  with  the  help  of  computer  technology  and/or  within  the  information  
technology,  such  as  cloud computing,  with  significant consequences  at  economic,  
political and social level. In front of the proliferation of acts adopted in this sector, a  
specific legal instrument in the fight against cyber terrorism and a definition of cyber  
terrorism are lacking.  
The first aim of the paper concerns the definition of cyber terrorism in the light of  
International Law and the case law of international tribunals and courts. In particular, the  
Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon recently has declared in Case No.  
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STL-11-01/I (Feb. 16, 2011) that there is a customary international law definition of  
terrorism. We will analyze if it is possible to apply this definition to cyber terrorism. As  
regards the definition of terrorism, the decision of the STL will be analyzed in light of  
relevant practice in order to clarify whether it could include cyber terrorism. An answers  
is needed in order to define the localization of jurisdiction, including the possibility to  
affirm the competence of existing International criminal courts and the idea to establish  
an International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace. Defining the cyber terrorism is crucial  
in order to identify the difference among this typology of crime and cyber war, the sector  
of international law that we can apply, the acknowledgment of the crime and the  
related state/individual responsibility. In the public international law this is crucial in  
order to identify the applicability of international law of armed conflict or international  







Cfr. Hosein, Threatening the Open Society: Comparing Anti-terror  Policies and Strategies in  
U.S. and Europe,  2005, avalaible at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/dec/gus-hosein- 
terror-reportdec2005.pdf ; United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Use of  
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The second aim of the paper regards the surveillance powers related to cyber terrorism,  
taking into account the international acts introduces after attacks of 2001. Among these,  
the UN Security Council Resolutions for the  creation of  black  lists  of  suspected  
terrorists  and  people  and  companies suspected  to  finance  terroristic  activities. In  
particular these Resolution required to States and the UE to enact patrimonial  and  
personal  restrictive  measures  against  them.  States  and  the  EU  have increased  
surveillance  and  investigation  powers  implementing  the  named  Resolutions. The  
increase of those powers results also from acts establishing forms of international  
cooperation among States, such as the 2005 Prüm Convention, promoted by EU Members  
to fight against crime. It is arguable the progressive formation of a normative corpus  
inspired to emergency criteria which allows, through the use of new ICT, the interception  
and collection of both neutral and sensitive personal data, also in the use of the smart grid  
services. If, on one hand, it is a tool used in the war on terrorism, on the other hand it  
implies the collection, treatment and recording of personal data that exceeds the need of  
security and could violate human rights. The administrative emergency, ultimately, must  
ensure the protection of human rights. The real problem is the disappearance of the  
temporary nature of the emergency requirement.  
 
2. The Problem of defining Terrorism and Cyber terrorism.  
The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon, requiring  
a proactive and coordinated response from Member States. In particular, in 2011, the  
General Assembly, in its resolution 66/178, reaffirmed the mandate of UNODC to  




CTITF Working Group Compendium, Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Legal and  
Technical Aspects, New York, 2011, available 
at  http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_interagency_wg_comp 
endium_legal_tech nical_aspects_web.pdf ;  UN  Resolution  A/res/60/288,  adopted  by  the  
General  Assembly  on  8 September 2006, avalaible at 
http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement;  G.  CARELLA,  Nominalismo  e 
lotta al terrorismo internazionale: il caso delle extraordinary renditions, in G. VENTURINI, S. BARIATTI 
(adited by), Liber Fausto Pocar. Diritti individuali e giustizia internazionale, vol. I, Milano, 2009, p. 111 ss. 
cfr. FOGGETTI, Cyber-Terrorism and the Right to Privacy in The Third Pillar Perspective, in Masaryk 
University Journal of Law and Technology, 2009, pp. 265-376.  
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pertinent thematic areas, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes2 . At this  
point it is necessary to examine whether at international level we can identify the notions  
of cyber terrorism and whether they have common traits. In a second step we must  
verify, if the definition of "customary" international terrorism it is applicable also to  
cyber terrorism. The literature has dealt with the issue, in the absence of a generally  
accepted definition  of  the  phenomenon,  often  considered  cyber  terrorism  "ordinary  
computer crimes but with the added intention to instill fear among a target audience"3.  
The most significant practices exanimated identifies two different definitions of cyber  
terrorism: one elaborate and implemented by the FBI and an other by NATO.  
For the FBI cyber terrorism is a "premeditated, politically motivated attack against  
information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence  
against  non-combatant  targets  by  sub-national  groups  or  clandestine  agents."4  
According to this definition in order to qualify an attack as cyber terrorism it is necessary  
that it is politically motivated and puts in place by sub-national groups or clandestine  
agents and takes place against informatics systems, computer programs and data, and  
produces damages against not military objectives. For NATO, cyber terrorism is a "cyber  
attack using or exploiting computer or communication networks sufficient to cause  
destruction or disruption to generate fear or to intimidate a society into an ideological  
goals."5  According to this definition, cyber attacks  with  an  ideological  aim  that  
using  or  exploiting  computer  networks  or communications, in order to cause the  
destruction or disruption capable of generating fear or intimidate society may fall into the  








Cfr.  Resolution  No.  66/178  adopeted  by  the  General  Assembly,  in  89th   Plenary  meeting,  
concerningTechnical assistence for implementing the international conventions and protocols related to  
counter-terrorism, of 19 December 2011, avalaible at this 
URL:  http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2010- 
2019/2011/General_Assembly/Resolution_66-178.pdf 
3 GARRETT-CLARKE, Cyberterrorism: A  New  Challenge for  International Law,  in  Enforcing  
International Law Norms Against Terrorism, (edited by) BIANCHI, Oxford- Portland, 2004, pp. 465 ss; 
DRAETTA, The Internet and Terrorist Activities, in Bianchi (edited by), Ibidem, in particular p. 453; 
RUOTOLO, Internet (Diritto internazionale), in Enciclopedia del diritto, Annali VII, Milano, pp. 545-567; I D, 
Internet-ional Law, Profili di diritto internazionale pubblico della rete, Bari, 2012. 
4 
POLLIT, Cyber-terrorism Fact or Fancy?, Proceedings of the 20th National Information Security  
Conference, in (edited by) POLLIT, Cyber terrorism: Fact or Fancy), Computer Fraud and Security, 1998. 
5 
Everard, Nato and Cyber terrorism, in Responses to cyber terrorism, (edited by), Centre of  
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The two definitions have the same psychological element: the political and ideological 
aim, but they are different regarding the objective element. For the FBI definition 
Computer Systems is t h e  target of the attack that becomes cyber attack in presence of 
this element. On the base of the second definition, the Computer system is the means 
through the cyber terrorist attack is realized.  
The FBI definition includes only the attack carry out by individual or groups of persons 
independent, or “sponsored” by a State, but it not includes the State’s Terrorism. The 
Nato definition’s is more inclusive.  
For the doctrine and case law, in the absence of a significant practice in relation to the  
definition of cyber terrorism can groped to frame the concept of cyber terrorism in light  
of general international law. In this context, particularly in the practice of the last ten  
years there have been major developments on the definition of terrorism7.  
It  is  necessary  t o   outline  that  in  a  significant  number  of  case  law,  the  Italian  
Court of Cassation and more Court of Appeal8, (Sent. 17-01-2007 Court of Cassation;  
Sent. 15-02- 2006 case Baouyahia et al. Court of Appeal of Milan) stated that there  
is a need to interpret the national law regarding terrorism in light of International law,  
on the base of a common customary rule that defines terrorism in time of peace. In this  
case-law, the Supreme court has stated that, according to the doctrine, there are two  
possible definition of terrorism in Italian criminal law: one for time of peace and anther  








BRUNST, Use of Internet by Terrorists - A Threat Analysis, in NATO Science for Peace and  
Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics, 2008, Ankara. 
7 
BETTONI, Terrorismo e Internet: alcune considerazioni giuridiche, politiche e tecnologiche, in  
Ciberspazio e Diritto, 2010 fasc. 1, pp. 231 - 249; Denning, Cyberterrorism Testimony before Special  
Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives, Available  
online   at:   http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html ;   CONWAY,   What   is  
Cyberterrorism?, Available in the NATO library at: CURRENT_HISTORY, vol. 101, no. 659, December 
2002, pp. 436-442; NETANYAHOU, Combattre le terrorisme international, 2002, Paris; Noto, Il terrorismo 
internazionale e le sanzioni del Consiglio di Sicurezza nella giurisprudenza italiana: il caso Daki, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale private e processuale, 2008, pp. 731-740. 
8 
Sent. 17-01-2007 Italian Court of Cassation n. 1072, Concorso di persone nel reato, associazione  
con finalità di terrorismo, avalaible at http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=36174 ; Sent. 22/10/2008,  
Italian Court of Cassation n. 39545, avalaible at http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=43932 ; Sent. 15- 
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It is possible to define the terrorism in time of peace, identifying, according with  
doctrines, as the conduct that includes three constitutive elements: the transnational  
nature of the terrorist act; the intent of the perpetrator to cause a state of terror in the  
general public or population, or to coerce a State or an international organization to  
commit or to omit a certain conduct and a political/ideological/religious aim9.  
In light of this issue it is possible to track the existence of an essential core for the 
creation of a customary rule about terrorism that includes just mentioned elements10.  
In relation to the first element, that defines the actus reus of the crime, it is necessary that 
the conduct will transcend the boundary of the State. Cyber terrorism complies in 
this definition because it is transnational in nature. This definition and the core elements 
not are apply in the case in which “ the offence is committed within a single State, the 
alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of that State and 
no other State has a basis … to exercise jurisdiction”11.  
Concerning the second element, the subjective element (mens rea), it is composed by two  
main element: the first is the dolus generalis, relating to specific crime; the secondly  


















Cfr G. DELLA MORTE, Sulla giurisprudenza italiana in tema di terrorismo internazionale, in  
Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2009, pp. 443-475; A. CASSESE, The multilateral criminal notion of  
Terrorism in International Law, in Journal of Int. Criminal Justice, 2006, pp. 933-943; A. CASSESE,  
Lineamenti di diritto internazionale penale - I. Diritto sostanziale, Bologna, 2005; A. CASSESE, Terrorism  
as an International Crime, in Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism, (edited by) A.  
BIANCHI, Oregon, 2004; VALSECCHI, Sulla definizione di terrorismo “in tempo di guerra”, in Diritto  
penale contemporaneo, avalaible 
at  http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/Nota%20Valsecchi%20Tigri%20T 
amil.pdf; VALSECCHI, Il problema della definizione di terrorismo, in Rivista italiana diritto e  
procedura penale,  2004, p. 1127 ss. In particular the thesis of prof. Cassese is based on the international 
practice “Lies in, or  results from, the converging adoption of national law, the handing down of  
judgement by national courts,  the passing od UN General Assembly resolutions, as well as the ratification of 
international convention by  great number of states”. 
10 
Cfr. CASSESE, Lineamenti di diritto internazionale penale, Bologna, il Mulino, 2005, pp. 162-75,  
in particular p. 167; A. CASSESE, Il sogno dei diritti umani, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2008, pp. 177-84, in 
particular p. 179.  
11 Cfr. Article 3 of the Convention for the suppression of crime of financing terrorism, New York, 1999.  
See also G. DELLA MORTE,  Sulla giurisprudenza italiana in tema di terrorismo internazionale, in Rivista  
di diritto internazionale, 2009, pp. 443-475; . G. CARELLA, Lotta al terrorismo e protezione dei rifugiati, in  
U. Lenza, (edited by) Le migrazioni. Una sfida per il diritto internazionale, comunitario e interno, Atti del IX 
Convegno SIDI svoltosi a Roma il 17 e 18 giugno 2004, Napoli, 2005, p. 177 ss.  
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something. In the light of the just mentioned doctrine and practice, the state of terror 
produced in the population is finalized at this result12.  
Concerning the third element, it excludes from it sphere of application, the private  
conducts, finalized at personal scope, i.e. private revenge or pursuing private economic  
goals.  
In conclusion terrorism in time of peace, may be qualify in the context of the “crime 
against humanity”13. In this case the actus reus will be included in a series of actions of 
conducts qualified as “crime against humanity” in international customary rules and 
treaties. Moreover this conducts will be ascribable in the context of a systematic and wide 
attack against civilians and with the awareness of such an attack.  
Moreover, the Special Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, states, concerning the crime of  
terrorism in  time  of  peace,  that “Customary  law  imposed  individual  liability  for  
violation of the prohibition of terror against the civilian population as enshrined in  
Article 51 (2) of Additional protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II”14  
Recently the Special Tribunal for Lebanon stated about the existence of customary rule  
in this matter. At this point we may analyze this definition, the issues related, the  
possibility to apply this definition to cyber terrorism conducts and if there are the  
requirements to apply this definition15. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established  
by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, after the Lebanese  
Parliament had failed to formally ratify an agreement between the UN and the Lebanese  
 
 
12 Cfr. G. CARELLA, Terrorismo di Stati e terrorismo di individui: il caso Lockerbie, in Studi in ricordo di  
A. F. Panzera, I , Bari, 1995, p. 201.  
13  In the light of Statute of International Criminal Court the conduct that fill in the crime against humanity  
are homicide, torture, rape, persecution, or “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing  
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”. On the bases of article 7 of the  
same Statute, par. 2, lett. A) “attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct  
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population,  
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”. In doctrine on this  
point see A. Arnold, The ICC as a New Instrument fro Repressing Terrorism, New York, 2004,  
14 Cfr. Sentence of Tribunal for former Jugoslavia, of 5 December 2005, The Prosecutor v. Galic, Case T- 
98-29-T,  and  of 30  November  2006,  The  Prosecutor  v.  Galic,  Case  IT-98-29-A,  avalaible  at  this  
URL:   http://www.icty.org/ 
15 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration,  
Cumulative Charging (Appeals Chamber) STL-11-01/I 16 February 2011 at [1] (“Interlocutory Decision”).  
In doctric cfr. SHARF, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of Terrorism  
and Modes of Participation, ASIL Insights <http://www.asil.org/insights110304.cfm>. The author wrote  
that “the landmark decision will gave a momentous effect on the decades-long effort of the international 
community to develop a broadly acceptable definition of terrorism.”  
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Government setting up an international tribunal to try all those allegedly responsible for 
the attack, and related killings, on the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 
February 200516.  
In Resolution 1757 (2007) the Security Council decided that the provisions of the  
agreement on the establishment of a Special Tribunal that was annexed to the resolution  
and the Tribunal’s Statute attached to the agreement would enter into force on 10  
June 2007,  unless  the  Government  of  Lebanon  notified  the  UN  that  the  legal  
requirements for entry into force had been complied with before that date17.  
The jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal covers the prosecution of persons responsible for  
the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister  
Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons, but could be extended if the Tribunal  
finds that certain other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12  
December 2005 are connected, in accordance with the principles of criminal justice, and  
are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005. Crimes that  
occurred after 12 December 2005 may also be included in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction  
under the same conditions if it is so decided jointly by the Government of the Lebanese  
Republic and the UN and with the consent of the Security Council (Art. 1 STL-Statute)18.  
The Statute further establishes that the Tribunal shall apply the “provisions of the  
Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism,  
crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to  
report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a  
crime, criminal participation and conspiracy as well as Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese  





Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon 15  
November 2006 (S/2006/893), unlike the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the  
Special Court for Sierra Leone that also have limited jurisdiction over domestic crimes, the Special  
Tribunal for Lebanon’s ratione materiae jurisdiction is limited solely to crimes under the Lebanese  
Criminal Code and does not extend to crimes under international law. Cfr. Clere, An Examination of the  
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Explosive Declaration of “Terrorism” at Customary International Law,  
Otago, 2012, avalaible at http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago043934.pdf 
17 
on 
Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting,  
30  May  2007,  S/res/1757  (2007),  avalaible  at  http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/363/57/PDF/N0736357.pdf?OpenElement 
18 
BUFALINI, Il tribunale speciale per i libano si pronuncia sul crimine di terrorismo nell’ambito di  
una singolare procedura, Nota a Tribunale per il Libano, Camera d’Appello, Caso No. STL-11-01/I, 16 
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struggle”’ (Art. 2 STL- Statute). Consequently, the STL is the first international criminal 
Court  which  will  try  persons  who  are  accused  solely  of  violating  domestic,  not 
international, criminal law.  
 
2.1. The decision of the Tribunal of Lebanon concerning terrorism definition’s.  
After having received an indictment filed by the Tribunal’s Prosecutor on 17 January  
2011, the Pre-Trial Judge submitted fifteen questions of law to the Appeals Chamber19.  
With regard to the notion of terrorist acts, the Pre-Trial Judge requested a decision on the  
following issues: i) Taking into account the fact that Article 2 of the Statute refers  
exclusively to the relevant provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code in order to define  
the notion of terrorist acts, should the Tribunal also take into account the relevant  
applicable international law? ii) Should the question raised in paragraph i) receive a  
positive response, how, and according to which principles, may the definition of the  
notion of terrorist acts set out in Article 2 of the Statute be reconciled with international  
law? In this case, what are the constituent elements, intentional and material, of this  
offence?  
On 16 February 2011 the Appeals Chamber, having heard the Prosecutor, the Head of the  
Defense Office and amici curiae via an expedited filing schedule, issued its 153 page  
decision.  
The Tribunal shall apply the Lebanese domestic crime of terrorism, interpreted in  
consonance  with international conventional and customary law that is  binding  on  
Lebanon20. Under Lebanese law the objective elements of terrorism are as follows: an act  
whether constituting an offence under other provisions of the Criminal Code or not; and  
the use of a means "liable to create a public danger". These means are indicated in an  
illustrative   enumeration:   explosive   devices,   inflammable   materials,   poisonous   or  
incendiary products, or infectious or microbial agents. According to Lebanese case law,  





KIRSCH-OEHMICHEN, Judges gone astray: The fabrication of terrorism as international crime by  
Special  Tribunal  for  Lebanon,    in  Durham    Law    Review    online,    available  
at  http://www.hammpartner.de/data/veroeffentlichungen/online-fassung-text.pdf 
20 
Alvarez-Juménez,  Methods  for  the  identification  of  customary  international  law  in  the  
international  Court  of  Justice’s  Jurisprudence,  2000-2009,  in  International  and  Comparative  Law 
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revolver, a letter bomb or a knife. The subjective element of terrorism is the special intent 
to cause a state of terror. Although Article 2 of the Statute enjoins the Tribunal to apply 
Lebanese law, the Tribunal may nevertheless take into account international law for the 
purpose of interpreting Lebanese law.  
In this respect, two sets of rules may be taken into account: the Arab Convention against  
Terrorism21, which has been ratified by Lebanon, and customary International law on  
terrorism in time of peace. A comparison between Lebanese law and the Convention  
shows that the two notions of terrorism have in common two elements: they both  
embrace acts; and they require the intent of spreading terror or fear. However, the  
Convention's definition is broader than that of Lebanese law in that it does not require  
the underlying act to be carried out by specific means, instrumentalities or devices. In  
other respects the Arab Convention's notion of terrorism is narrower: it requires the  
underlying act to be violent, and it excludes acts performed in the course of a war of  
national liberation (as long as such war is not conducted against an Arab country). On the  
basis of treaties, UN resolutions and the legislative and judicial practice of States, there is  
convincing evidence that a customary rule of international law has evolved on terrorism  
in time of peace, requiring the following elements:  
(i) the intent (dolus) of the underlying crime and  
(ii) the special intent (dolus specialis) to spread fear or coerce authority; 
(iii)the commission of a criminal act, and  
(iv)that the terrorist act be transnational.  
The very few States that still insist on an exception, for the Special Tribunal to the  
definition of terrorism can, at most, be considered persistent objectors. A comparison  
between the crime of terrorism as defined under the Lebanese Criminal Code and that  
envisaged in customary international law shows that the notion in the customary rule is  
broader with regard to the means of carrying out the terrorist act, which are not limited  
under international law, and narrower in that it only deals with terrorist acts in time of  
peace, it requires both an underlying criminal act and an intent to commit that act and it  







The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Signed at Cairo on 22 April 1998,  
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As a result, for the purpose of adjudicating these facts, the Tribunal is justified in 
applying, at least in one respect, a construction of the Lebanese Criminal Code's 
definition of terrorism more extensive that suggested by Lebanese case law. While 
Lebanese courts have held that a terrorist attack must be carried out through one of the 
means enumerated in the Criminal Code, the Code itself suggests that its list of 
implements  is  illustrative,  not  exhaustive,  and  might  therefore  include  also  such 
implements as hand guns, machine-guns and so on, depending on the circumstances of 
each case. This interpretation of Lebanese law better addresses contemporary forms of 
terrorism, such as cyber terrorism and also aligns Lebanese law more closely with the 
relevant international law that is binding on Lebanon.  
A central issue concerns the compatibility of this interpretation with the principle of 
legality22. For Special tribunal this interpretation does not run counter to the principle of 
legality (nullum crimen sine lege) because this interpretation is consistent with the 
offence as explicitly defined under Lebanese law. On the bases of the sentence of the 
Tribunal, moreover, it was accessible to the accused, especially given the publication of 
the Arab Convention and other international treaties ratified by Lebanon in the Official 
Gazette (none of which limits the means or implements by which terrorist acts may be 
performed), hence, it was reasonably foreseeable by the accused.  
In sum, and in light of the principles enunciated above, the notion of terrorism to be 
applied by the Tribunal consists of the following elements:  
(i) the volitional commission of an act;  
(ii) through means that are liable to create a public danger; and 





Cfr. G. WERLW, F. JESSBERGER, Principles of Intentional Criminal law, Third Ed., Oxford, 2014;  
M. C. BASSIOUNI, International Criminal Law, Third ed.. Vol. II, Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement  
Mechanisms, 2008, Leiden; H. H. JESCHECK, The General Principles of International Criminal Law set-out  
in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2004, pp. 38- 
55; M. CAIANIELLO, E. FRONZA, Il Principio di legalità nello Statuto della Corte Penale Internazionale, in  
Aa. Vv., La Corte Penale Internazionale per l'ex Jugoslavia, (edited by) G. CARLIZZI, G. DELLA MORTE, A.  
MARCHESI, Napoli, 2003; M.C. BASSIOUNI, International Crimes: “Jus Cogens” and “Obligation Erga  
omnes”, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 1996, pp. 63-74; G.  CARELLA, Il Tribunale penale  
internazionale per l'ex Jugoslavia, in P. PICONE, (edited by), Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e diritto  
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Considering that the elements of the notion of terrorism do not require an underlying 
crime, the perpetrator of an act of terrorism that results in deaths would be liable for 
terrorism,  with  the  deaths  being  an  aggravating  circumstance;  additionally,  the 
perpetrator may also, and independently, be liable for the underlying crime if he had the 
requisite criminal intent for that crime.  
This definition may be applied also for the cyber terrorism.  
This definition also allows us to identify the differences between cyber terrorism and 
cyber war: the objective element is the same, but the actor is different, because the cyber 
war should be realized by a State. The fundamental difference is the nature of the 
aggressor. If this is the conclusion of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, it is necessary to 
analyze two core issues related to it. The first is related to the definition of cyber 
terrorism and in particular to the possibility that the cyber terrorism is able to generate a 
public danger, considered the means used and the second is a legal technical issue 
concerning the conditions for the formation of a customary rule.  
Concerning the first issue, the UNDOC (United Nations office on Drugs and Crime) in  
the official document “The Use of the Internet for Terrorist purposes, edited by UN in  
N.Y, established that “ The use of the Internet to further terrorist purposes disregards  
national borders, amplifying the potential impact on victims”. The existence of the  
possibility to cause “public danger” requirement will be analyzed on a case by case23.  
Massive and coordinated cyber attacks were in May 2007 launched against websites of  
the government, banks, telecommunications companies, Internet service providers and  
news organizations in Estonia24. The attacks have been described as targeted and well  
organized from outside Estonia, and were attacks on the public and private critical  









United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Use of the Internet for Terrorist  
Purposes, New York, 2012, avalaible 




HERZOG, Revisiting the Estonian cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses, in  
 of  Strategic  Security,  2011,  avalaible 
at  http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&conte 
xt=jss ; CZOSSECK,   OTTIS, TALIHÄRM,  Estonia  After  the  2007  Cyber  Attacks:  Legal,  Strategic  and  
Organization Changes in   Cyber security, in WARREN  (edited by), Case Studies in Information Warfare  
and Security, 2013, London,  pp.72-91; ALENIUS, An Exceptional war that Ended in Victory for Estonia or  
an Ordinary e-disturbance?  Estonian Narratives of the Cyber-Attacks, in 2007, ibidem, pp. 55-71.  
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world were involved through the use of botnets. Some described it as “the Big Bang” as 4 
million packets of data per second, every second for 24 hours, bombarded a host of 
targets that day. The attacks forced banks to shut down online services for all customers 
for an hour and a half, and disrupted government communications.  
In the 2012, a new malware has affected the network authorize to the Informatics system  
control  of  the  Iranian  Center  for  Nuclear  Energy:  the  computer  of  the  Iranian  
Organization, at the moment of the collapse have reproduce the song “Thunderstruck” of  
the Australian hard-rock band AC/DC. The same song that in the Panama invasion of  
1989, used by U.S. Army in order to force the General Noriega to leave the reinforced  
residence25.  
Cyber  attack  are  used,  generally,  to  disable  or  manipulate  physical  or  critical 
infrastructure, for example the provision of electrical networks, railroads, or water 
supplies could be infiltrated to have wide negative impacts on particular geographical 
areas. Moreover cyber terrorism attacks are used against a cloud computing server in 
which are stored sensitive data, health data or security data26.  
NATO defines critical infrastructure or (CI) as those facilities, services and information 
systems which are so vital to nations that their incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on national security, national economy, public health and safety and 
the effective functions of a government. CI can also include a dizzying array of physical 
assets, functions, information, people, and systems or what we now call nation’s critical 
infrastructures.  To  protect  CI,  government  and  industry  must  collectively  identify 
priorities, articulate clear goals, mitigate risk, measure progress and adapt based on 







SANGER, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Agaist Iran, in New Your Times, June, 1,  
2012. Ruotolo, Internet-ional Law, Profili di diritto internazionale pubblico della rete, op.cit., in particular  
p. 98 ss; BUYLER, When Cyberwapons End up on Private Networks: Third Amendment Implication for 
Cybersecurity Policy, in American University law Review, 2013, pp. 1204-1238; DENNING, Stuxnet: What has 
Changed?, in Future Internet, 2012, pp. 672-687.  
26   MURAT DOGRUL , ADIL ASLAN , EYYUP CELIK, Developing an International   Cooperation on Cyber  
Defense and Deterrence against Cyber Terrorism, in 2011 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict,  
C. CZOSSECK, E. TYUGU, T. WINGFIELD (Eds.) Tallinn, Estonia, 2011.  
27 In the past decade, NATO has made considerable progress in areas of importance to the Alliance such as  
operations, enhanced intelligence exchange and the development of technology solutions through the  
Defence against Terrorism Program of Work and the Science for Peace and Security Program. With respect  
to issues and concerns, security planners are confronted with panoply of possible future scenarios coming  
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Concerning the second issue, the doctrine show that The Appeals Chamber’s reasoning 
with regard to the notion of terrorism contains two major flaws:  
0  it will be demonstrated that for tasks at hand it was unnecessary for the Appeal 
Chamber to establish whether terrorism was a criminal offence under international 
customary law or not.  
1  The fining that a customary rule of international law regarding the international 
crime of terrorism, at last in time of peace, have evolved is based on insufficient and 
therefore cannot be upheld.  
It is possible manage the first question, but it is necessary to look at the second aspect, 
that of the reconstruction of about the existence of a rule of customary law to define 
international terrorism.  
Doctrine  defines  the  reconstruction  of  the  Appeal’s  Chamber  as  “revolutionary”  
and “highly inventive” for serious reason. Firstly, many scholars and other legal experts  
have  already   stated,  currently   no   universal   definition   of   terrorism   exist.   This  
agreement   not  only  applies  to  international  treaty  law,  but  also  to  customary  
international law. For the doctrine the conditions for a rule establishing a definition of  
terrorism under customary criminal international law have not been met in the case of  
terrorism.  The  essence  of custom,  according  to  article 38  of  the  Statute  of  the  
International Court of Justice, is that it should present “evidence of a general practice  
accepted as law”.28  In order for a rule of customary international law to exist, tow  
requirements need to e fulfilled: the material  
 
 
collected on their deliberations—to red-team brainstorming efforts to explore ways adversaries might  
attack in the future. NATO has prepared a ‘Strategic Concept’ in 2010, and revised it in 2011, to further  
develop its ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks by expanding its  
capacity in cyber-security. NATO Member States reinforced the importance of international cooperation in  
the Chicago Summit Declaration of May 2012. Cooperation between member states is important for  
organizing, creating and enforcing a security standard about those national cyber-systems, which are vital  
for the effective functioning of the whole alliance. This includes collaboration on a number of fronts  
including optimized information sharing, situational awareness, and secure interoperability based on agreed  
sets of common standards. Countering terrorism and the protection of CI requires partnerships. Achieving  
NATO counter-terrorism goals requires an integrated, collaborative approach by government, the private  
sector, citizens, and other international partners. It will never be possible to stop all terrorist attacks. Cfr.  
Critical Infrastructure Protection against Terrorist Attacks, Course Report, Nato Coe Dat, Ankara, Turkey,  
3-7,  November 2014,  available  at  this  url:  http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/course_reports/12- 
CIP.pdf 
28  
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is widely recognized as the most  
authoritative statement as to the sources of international law. It provides as follows: “the Court, whose  
function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the  
contesting parties; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the  
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provision of Article 59, judicial  
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary  
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element, i.e. there must be a widespread repetition by States of similar international acts  
over time (State practice), and the psychological or subjective element, i.e. the belief that  
such behaviors is “law”, i.e. legally binding (the formation of an opinion iuris sive  
necessistatis in international community), as opposed to a mere moral or social obligation  
or usage29. A core issue concerns the Opinio juris sive necessitates, as a constitutive  
element  of  a customary rule in international law.30  Doctrine states that the Appeal  
Chamber stars in a rather unconventional fashion, namely by citing a few - to be  
exact:  five -  selected decision of different national courts which are found to have  
acknowledged  the  existence  of a common  definition of terrorism under customary  
international  law.  Judicial  decisions  act  as  a  subsidiary  means  for  determining  
international legal rules on the bases of art. 38 (1) (d) of the ICJ Statute. For this  
reason, they may constitute persuasive evidence of a customary rule31. A limited number  
of isolated decisions suggest the  emergence of  a definition  of “terrorism”  under  
international law, they all offer different definitions of what it entails. Concerning the  
definition of terrorism, doctrine notes that the STL cites nine judicial decisions as  
evidence of explicit recognition of a crime of terrorism under customary international  
and that the Appeals Chamber does not discuss. Doctrine notes that it ignores, either by  
omission or relegation to a single footnote, a number of identifiable authoritative domestic  






TEUBNER, International Customary Law and Codification, Leiden, 1972; TUNKIN, Remarks on  
the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, in California Law Review, pp. 419-435;  
SEGURA SERRANO, Internet Regulation and the Role of International Law, in; Max Planck Yearbook of  
United Nations Law, 2006, p. 377 ss.; POLANSKI, Customary Law in the Internet: in the Search for a  
Supranational Cyberspace Law, Berlin, 2007; CHIK, Customary internt-ional law: Creating a body of  
customary law for cyberspace, in Computer & Security Review, 2010, pp. 3-28; DUMBERRY, Incoherent  
and Infeffective: the concept of Persistent Objector Revisited, in International and Comparative Law  
Quarterly, 2010,  pp.778-802;  ALVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ,  Methods  for  the  Identification  of  Customary  
International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009, in International and  
Comparative Law Quarterly, 2001, pp. 681-712; CONFORTI, Diritto internazionale, Napoli, 2014. 
30 
CONFORTI, Diritto internazionale, Napoli, 2014; B.D. LEPARD, The necessity of Opinio Juris in  
the  formation  of  Customary  international  Law,  Discussion  Paper  for  Panel  on  “Does  Customary  
International Law Need Opinio Juris?”, available at this 
URL:  https://law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/opiniojuris/panel_2-lepard- 
the_necessity_of_opinio_juris_in_the_formation_of_customary_international_law.pdf;    J.    KAMMERHOFER,  
Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its  
Problems, in European Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 523-534; M. MENDELSON, The Subjective  
Element in Customary International Law, in British Yearbook of International Law, 66, 1995, pp. 206-207.  
BIN CHENG, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Customary Law?, in  
International Law: Teaching and Practice, (edited by) BIN CHENG, London, 1982, pp. 251 in particular  
affirming that “international customary law has in reality only one constitutive element, the opinio juris”.  
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In  particular,  there  ware  no  reference  to  the  only  known international  precedent  
according to which “terrorism as never been singly defend under international law”.  
Nonetheless,  the  Appeals  Chamber  presents  the  cited  cases  as  reflective of  the  
collective jurisprudence of the international community. Doctrine outline that a closer  
scrutiny of the cases suggests that the Appeals Chamber appears to have “misread,  
exaggerated or misinterpreted every one of those decisions”32. Some national judicial  
decisions have recognized that specific offences of terrorism, such as hijacking and  
hostage taking, may have acquired customary status. Between these, only one decision  
explicitly states that terrorism has crystallized into a customary crime and provides a  
definition33. Yet  in that decision  by the  Italian  Supreme  Court  of  Cassation,  the  
definition formulated departed from that proffered by Appeals Chamber. The Italian  
Court required an additional indispensable element in order fro conduct to amount to  
terrorism. By disregarding a mandatory element of the Italian Court’s definition, the  
Appeals Chamber’s reliance is both selective than objectionable. Thus the key judgment  
on which the Appeals Chamber relies is fundamentally incompatible with its own  
conclusion. None of the decisions analyzed, individually or collectively, supports the  
Appeals Chamber’s formulation of a customary crime of terrorism34. For the doctrine  
these cases are not sufficient.  
In the field of this objections it is possible to noted that the Appeals Chamber is not 
blinded to the fact that these decision are not, as such, sufficient to establish a rule 
under customary law.  
 
32 Prosecutor v Stanilav Galic (Trial Judgement and Opinion) Appeals Chamber IT-98-29-T 5 December  
2003.  
33 A. CLERE, An Examination of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Explosive Declaration of “Terrorism”  
at Customary International Law, Otago, 2012, available at this 
url:  http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago043934.pdf The case law cfr.  Bouyahia Maher  
Ben   Abdelaziz et al, Judgement of 11 October 2006 Corte di Cassazione.  
34 At [2.1] The Italian Court of Cassation required that the act in question must contain a “political, 
religious or ideological motivation in accordance with generally accepted international standards”. The 
Court stated that without this purposive element, the concerned act cannot be constituted as terrorism as it 
lacks the additional characteristic that transforms other crimes into the special crime of terrorism. The 
Appeals Chamber (Interlocutory Decision, above n 23, at 106) observed that discrepancies in state practice 
concerning the inclusion of an element of ideological, political, religious or racial motive “has not yet been so 
broadly and consistently spelled out and accepted as to rise to the level of customary law….[I]t remains to be 
seen whether one day it will emerge as an additional element of the international crime of terrorism”, and so 
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It states that: “However significant these judicial pronouncements may be an expression  
of the legal view of the courts of different States, to establish beyond any shadow of doubt  
whether a customary rule of international law has crystallized on must also delve into  
other elements”.  
It is possible, in this context to note that United Nation General Assembly has insisted  
since 1994 that “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the  
general public, a group of persons for political purposes are in any circumstance  
unjustifiable”35.  
The UN has established the Ad Hoc Committee tasked to draft a Comprehensive  
Convention on Terrorism. The committee has not achieved to come up with such a  
comprehensive convention, because there are pending issues of constant disagreements  
that include:  
a)  whether the Draft Convention should adopt an armed conflict or law enforcement  
 approach to counter-terrorism;  
b)  whether a definition of terrorism should include or exclude “state terrorism”;  
c)  whether armed resistance to an occupying regime or to colonial alien domination  
 should be included or excluded.  
For these elements it is possible to states that there are not an opinion iuris or an  
agreement, but it is possible that this agreement may concerns the substantial elements.  
Moreover, the UN convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism provides  
the UN’s clearest definition of terrorism, which includes the elements of (i) a criminal act  
(ii) intended to intimidate a population or compel an authority, and is limited to those 
crimes containing (iii) a transnational aspect36.  
The interpretation of Lebanon or Italian Criminal law concerning terrorism in light of 
international law, may be considered such as an “evolutionary adaptation” to the to the 




35 Cfr. Resolution 51/210, concerning Measures to eliminate international terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly  in  88th   Plenary  meeting,  A/RES/51/210,  of 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r210.htm 
36 
17  December  1996,  available  at  this  URL:  
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terroris, Adopted by the General  
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In this field it is possible to comply the three strictly requirement established by European  
Court of Human Rights in order to derogate the principle of legality: the adherence of the  
new figura criminis to the essential core of crime; the conformity with fundamental  
criminal international principles; its reasonable foreseeability for of the recipients.37  
The nature and the purpose of the institution of STL are not an obstacle to this  
interpretation. The persons accused in the future will be guaranteed by the need for  
International Tribunal to prove more adjective condition for prosecute the action.  
Moreover, if the STL or other international o special Tribunal established on the Base of  
the VII Chapter of the UN Treaty, not apply a definition international oriented of crimes  
such as Terrorism, their function may be nullified. Their institution, in fact is justified on  
the inadequacy of national courts to prosecute the core crime, or the crime that transcend  
national bounders, that are transnational in nature.  
The STL is a small but important step in the international community towards the  
preparation of breath supranational institutions capable of guaranteeing the human right  
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Appreciation under the European Convention on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application  
in Practice, 1998, in 19 Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 1-36; N.LAVENDER, The Problem of the Margin of  
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Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 1996, in Zeitschrift für  
Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkrecht, pp. 240-341; T.H. JONES, The Devaluation of Human  
Rights Under the European Convention, in Public Law, 1995, pp. 430-449; R.ST.J. MACDONALD, The  
Margin of Appreciation, in R.ST.J. MACDONALD, F. MATSCHER AND H. PETZOLD (edidet by), The  
European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993, pp. 83-124; A.  
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2 - The Protection of Human Rights in Europe , Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1990, pp. 99-161; The Margin  
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Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in Human  
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the preamble of the Declaration Universal Declaration of Human Rights of  1948: 
freedom from fear ("freedom from fear"), or rather by terror.  
 
3. The EU Antiterrorism measure and the right to privacy in the EU and 
ECHR prospective.  
A moreover issue that we must examine is whether the acts in question meet the  
fundamental principles of European law and European Convention on Human Rights.  
The protection of privacy under the law remains anchored however to the First pillar,  
while the fight against terrorism and crime takes place in the Second and Third pillar. For  
this reason it is difficult to balance the protection of privacy with the fight against  
international terrorism and to assess the impact of measures taken by institutions in order  
to reach this specific purpose.  
In the just mentioned case law, the European Court of the Court held that the powers of 
the  Community  should  be  exercised  in  accordance  with  international  law.  This 
provision applies even in the maintenance of international peace and security in the 
implementation of resolutions adopted by the CdS under Chapter VII of the Charter38. The 
EU Court states that the Regulation is an EU act and then the Court is asked to assess their 
compatibility with fundamental rights.  
In this contest, the EU Court of Justice in a Case of September 3 , 2008, annuls the  
Council Regulation on May 27, 2002, n. 881, which imposes restrictive measures  
directed against certain persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al- 
Qaeda and the Taliban, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 467/200139.  
But it orders that effects of Regulation No 881/2002 to be maintained, so far as they  
concern Mr Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation, for a period that may not  
exceed three months running from the date of delivery of this judgment40.  
However, the reasoning of the Court of Justice clearly shows the prevalence of the need  
to respond to the terrorist threat.  






Judgment of the Court of 20 May 2008, C-91/05, Commission v Council, i; www.europa.eu 
Judgment of the Court of 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P e C-415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi c.  
Council, in www.europa.eu. 
40 
Council Regulation of 27 May 2002, Official Journal of EU, L 139, 2002. 
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In the second instance we must analyze if the PNR Agreement impair the European  
Convention on data retention and European Convention on Human rights.  
To analyze the admissibility of the transfer of personal data in the light of the European  
Convention for the protection of data, we must consider the letter sent in July 2007 by  
DHS particularly the statement which outlined the terms and conditions for the data  
transfer .  
The letter states that the data transferred to US authorities will be used solely for the 
prevention  and  suppression  of  international  terrorism  and  related  crimes  and  the 
prosecution of other serious crimes, including transnational organized crime41.  
Personal  data  undergoing  automatic  processing  shall  be  stored  for  specified  and 
legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes. The purpose 
of the fight against terrorism is determined. On the contrary, we cannot say that the aim is 
determined or determinable in relation with the crimes. The letter does not reveal, in fact, 
what are the serious crimes listed in the letter, which will be the criteria to be taken into 
consideration in order to identify these types of crimes.  
We can therefore conclude that the agreement signed bring the Convention signed by EU 
Member States in relation to the obligation to ensure the definition and certainty of the 
purpose for which this is done.  
The agreement also contrasts with Article 6 of the Convention concerning personal data. 
For this particular category of personal data, the Convention provides that they may not 
be processed automatically if national laws do not establish appropriate safeguards.  
The same agreement also does not allow an adequate protection of the right to correct 
personal data subject to treatment and thus it is contrary to Article 8 of the European 
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The PNR agreement and the letter DHS, in fact, guarantee only the application of the law  
in force in the U.S. on the matter, such as the Patriot Act. But it is applicable only to U.S.  
citizens.  
Neither is true that the mere reference made by the DHS letter of this legislation, ensure 
the extension of its scope to individuals holding the data processed regardless of the 
nationality of the same.  
The agreement is contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as 
interpreted by the Strasbourg court.  
In particular, analyzing the prevailing case law of the European Court, it can be  
concluded  that  the  collection  and  transmission  of  personal  information  by  public  
authorities brigs the article 8. On the basis of criteria identified by the Court in its  
jurisprudence, a treatment must pursue a legitimate aim of public interest, and it must  
be proportionate42.  
 
 
4. The protection of individuals against acts affecting the right to privacy.  
At EU level, citizens can appeal to the Court of First Instance and then to the Court of  
Justice of the European Union, but we have seen that recent case law is not in favor of  
the protection of fundamental rights when dealing with the fight against terrorism. We  
must then determine whether the conclusion of the PNR is attributable to the states. In  
order to solve this problem we must refer to the legal basis on which the agreement was  
concluded.  
The legal basis is Articles 24 and 38 EU Treaty. An analysis of these provisions easily  
shows the crucial role played by Member States in concluding such agreements.  
Article 24 states that the Council may decide by a qualified majority whether the  
agreement is expected to implement a common position or a joint action. It should be  
noted that these acts must be approved unanimously. Article 24 refers to Article 23, par.  
2 which state that “If a member of the Council declares that, for important reasons of 
national policy, intends to oppose the adoption of a decision taken by qualified majority, a 
vote. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, requests that the matter be referred to the 
European Council for decision by unanimity.  
The role of States is essential in this case. Data processing must respect the principle of  
proportionality.  
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In this particular context, the Court has noted, on several occasions, that in order to assess  
the proportionality of the same treatment, states must guarantee the right of access to  
data. The agreement provides only for transferring data from European airlines to US  
authorities. The agreement conflicts with the European Convention on Human rights.  
The states are liable for the breach of the European Convention on Human Rights In the 
fight against terrorism.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
Many countries introduced extraordinary laws and policies and emergency legislation.  
We see the introduction of new surveillance power of the State in answers to terrorism.  
Privacy was also affected by the use of very technologically advanced instruments of  
control43.  
The administration of emergency has ultimately become “condicio sine qua non” for the 
maintenance of international security.  
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through  the  media,  the  courts,  and  in  the  public  sphere.  Some  have  been  
seriously amended or found unconstitutional while others have been enhanced.  
the program for intercepting telephone calls and e-mail authorized by Bush 2001  
and renewed in subsequent years, was ultimately blocked for violation of the First  
and the Fourth Amendment. In particular, the Court of Detroit noted that "It is not  
possible  to pursue the goal of security by depriving citizens of constitutionally  
guaranteed rights".  
The administrative emergency, ultimately, must ensure the protection of human 
rights. The  real  problem  is  the  disappearance  of  the  temporary  nature  of  the 
emergency requirement.  
What is more significant in view of the measures taken to combat international  
terrorism, will be the loss of the temporary nature of the emergency requirement.  
In short, the emergency and the rules designed to adjust from temporary became  
permanent.  
The Court maintained that the proportionality test has to be applied by taking into 
consideration a number of factors, such as the nature of the rights affected and the 
duration of the measures.  
The Court made clear that the States are bound to the continuous reassessment of the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted and to repeal if they are found inadequate to 
meet the danger.  
A  further  element  that  plays  an  increasingly  important  role  in  assessing  the  
measures proportionality  is  the  existence  of  safeguards  against  the  abuse  of  
emergency powers. When the Executive interferes on fundamental values, such  
as personal freedom or privacy, the derogating measures are proportionate only  
when it provides a meaningful degree of judicial or independent control.  
However, we doubt that the EU law, today, ensured an effective remedy for  
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